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INTRODUCTION 
While several court rulings have recognized parental rights over 
education to varying degrees,1 the emergence of a common public school 
agenda has led to an increasing establishment of barriers limiting 
opportunities for parents to exercise their rights and control over the 
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 1. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
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upbringing of their children via school choice initiatives.2 Parental rights and 
the exercise of choice are further complicated and restricted for parents of 
students with disabilities. Although the right to an education is protected 
under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA),3 parental 
choice is recast as parental participation in the educational decisions affecting 
children with disabilities. In other words, parents of students with disabilities 
have no meaningful choice and can exercise extremely limited control over 
the education and upbringing of their children if they want to enjoy the 
protections afforded under the IDEA.4 
The desire to exercise parental control and choice is often driven by 
concerns about marked differences between personal beliefs and school 
curricular choices,5 as well as the desire to raise children in accordance with 
family values and traditions.6 Conflicts over curriculum have led to litigation 
by many parents, albeit largely unsuccessful. In these cases, parents were 
seeking relief from school board imposed instruction on topics ranging from 
homosexuality, transgender issues, non-traditional family depictions, and 
human sexuality in general.7 Although parental exercise of choice with 
respect to their children’s educational, moral, and religious upbringing has 
been at the core of many legal disputes between parents and school districts,8 
there are a myriad of other factors influencing parental choice motives, such 
as ideological beliefs,9 child-benefit theories,10 and special educational 
needs.11 
Efforts to diminish parents’ educational rights and choices have 
occurred through deliberate governmental actions that were motivated in part 
by fundamental beliefs about the role of public education in the furtherance 
of state and national interests and preparation of educated members of 
society.12 For example, state legislatures have adopted limits on parental 
                                                 
 2. Curtis Schube, Public Schools are Replacing Parents: The Erosion of the Parental 
Right to Control the Educational and Moral Upbringing of Children, 12 T.M. COOLEY J. 
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 121, 121-45 (2010). 
 3. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 
(2012). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Kenneth L. Townsend, Education and the Constitution: Three Threats to Public 
Schools and the Theories That Inspire Them, 85 MISS. L.J. 327, 330 (2016). 
 6. See Schube, supra note 2, at 137. 
 7. See id. at 121. 
 8. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972). 
 9. Henry M. Levin, The Public-Private Nexus in Education, 43 THE AM. BEHAV. SCI. 
124, 135-36 (1999). 
 10. Ira Bloom, New Parental Rights Challenge to School Control: Has the Supreme 
Court Mandated School Choice? 32 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 139-83 (2003) (identifying the 
legitimate interests of parents in improving educational opportunities for their children). 
 11. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 557 U.S. 230, 234 (2009); Sch. Comm. of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 359 (1985). 
 12. See e.g., Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a 
Multicultural Democracy, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 277, 290-91 (2001); John Dewey, The School as 
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rights to control education and exercise choice in order to promote 
assimilation13 and maintain separation between state government and 
religious entities through state constitutional amendments, such as the Blaine 
Amendments.14 Additional boundaries exist, perhaps unintentional but with 
no less negative impacts, on parental rights and choice regarding the 
education of students with disabilities who qualify for services under the 
IDEA.15 
Part I of this note examines the parental rights doctrine emerging 
from the U.S. Supreme Court and describes the historical perspectives on 
child development and educational interests that also factor into the 
discussion about parental rights over education. The limits on parental rights 
and control are analyzed in Part II, with specific attention on states’ legal 
efforts—through constitutional and statutory provisions—to replace parental 
control over education and upbringing with state control. Part III examines 
the federal disability laws that apply specifically to protect the rights of 
students with disabilities as well as the rights of their parents or guardians. 
Part III also addresses the concerns of school choice opponents who assert 
the need for limits on state-supported choice initiatives given the perceived 
negative impacts of such programs on public education. Part IV summarizes 
the promises and perils of special education voucher programs (SVPs), which 
are often described as an emerging educational reform movement that seeks 
to expand school choice options for parents of students with disabilities16 and 
identifies the need for legislative reform of the IDEA. Finally, the Conclusion 
offers concluding remarks and recommends expansion of the choice debate 
in order to reflect a continuum perspective of educational placements that 
empower parents of students with disabilities to preserve their family’s 
values and beliefs while also securing a high-quality education for their 
children.17 
I.  THE PARENTAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
The foremost exercise of parental choice is the de facto 
determination of where to live. In other words, parental choice regarding the 
education of children is primarily a factor of where parents decide to live 
                                                 
a Means of Developing Social Consciousness and Social Ideals in Children, 1 J. SOC. 
FORCES 513, 516 (1923). 
 13. Mark E. DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: 
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551 (2003). 
 14. See Michael P. Dougherty, Montana’s Constitutional Prohibition on Aid to 
Sectarian Schools: “Badge of Bigotry” or National Model for the Separation of Church and 
State?, 77 MONT. L. REV. 41 (2016). 
 15. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (2010). 
 16. See Susan C. Bon, Janet Decker & Natasha Strassfeld, Special Education Voucher 
Programs, Reflective Judgment, and Future Legislative Recommendations, 91 PEABODY J. 
OF EDUC. 503 (2015). 
 17. Bloom, supra note 10. 
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given the tradition in the United States of using geographic boundaries to 
determine neighborhood public school attendance.18 The notion of 
democratic localism19 preserved, to some extent, the balance of control 
between parents and school districts. Namely, this theory proposed that 
parents could maintain control over their values and beliefs through local 
communities.20 In other words, parental control could occur through the local 
community, which would make it unnecessary to formalize such control 
through educational choice options. 
School choice reform efforts, on the other hand, reflect deliberate 
attempts by parents to exercise control over educational decisions for their 
children by challenging established educational norms and asserting their 
rights to circumvent the monopoly of public schools.21 While some have 
argued that past choice initiatives were motivated by racial animus,22 the 
counter argument for choice is premised on ideological beliefs about values, 
liberty, and freedom.23 In fact, parents’ desires to avoid influences over their 
children that are inconsistent with their family values and beliefs are not 
recent developments. Rather, parents have previously sought to advance their 
religious interests and parental control over education in the courts.24 
The essential role and influence of education on a child’s 
development, according to Locke,25 establishes the importance of 
maintaining parental control over the child’s educational experience.26 
Through clarification about the unique roles of parents as leaders of the 
family, churches as guardians of religion, and government as protectors of 
civil society, Locke describes the boundaries and expectations regarding 
these three distinctive societies.27 Despite varying interpretations of Locke’s 
many essays, his assertions about the roles of parents, churches, and 
                                                 
 18. John Merrifield, The Twelve Policy Approaches to Increased School Choice, 2 J. 
SCH. CHOICE: INT’L RES. & REFORM 4, 6 (2008). 
 19. MICHAEL B. KATZ, CLASS, BUREAUCRACY, AND SCHOOLS: THE ILLUSION OF 
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 17 (2d ed. 1975). 
 20. ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CHARTING CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM: DEMOCRATIC 
LOCALISM AS A LEVER FOR CHANGE 254 (1998). 
 21. JOHN CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 189 
(1990); see also Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, 
and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 665 (1998). 
 22. Mark A. Gooden, Huriya Jabbar & Mario S. Torres, Jr., Race and School 
Vouchers: Legal, Historical, and Political Contexts, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 522, 523 (2016). 
 23. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, CHAP. VI: THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN EDUCATION (M. Friedman, ed. 1962). 
 24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972). 
 25. John Locke has written extensively about education and is cautiously described as 
an “educationist” given his general theories which relate significantly to his work on 
education. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (1989). 
 26. NATHAN TARCOV, LOCKE’S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY 3 (1999). 
 27. Alex Tuckness, Locke on Education and the Rights of Parents, 36 OXFORD REV. 
EDUC. 627, 628 (2010). 
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government reveal that the three societies are related, yet distinctly 
responsible for particular roles.28 
Locke asserts that the parents, as founders of the family, are uniquely 
responsible for the care and education of their children.29 With respect to 
religion, Locke asserts that spiritual endeavor is both the foundation of 
churches and the responsibility of churches to pursue and cultivate.30 He 
further explains that neither the civil society nor government is responsible 
for, nor should it impede, religious ends.31 Instead, society benefits from the 
formation of governmental structures that are designed to pursue the civil 
interests of citizens through economic, military, and other necessary 
structures that protect life and property.32 
As revealed in Locke’s essays, there exists an impending tension 
between parental interests over controlling their children’s education and the 
goal of government to promote education for the good of society.33 While 
affirmation of these concurrent rights is enshrined in the United States 
Constitution, efforts to balance the potentially conflicting rights emerge in 
the courts where the constitutional rights are interpreted with deference to the 
varying contexts in which such disputes arise.34 Despite assertions that there 
is not a specified parental right to control the educational upbringing of 
children, a series of judicial affirmations regarding parents’ rights to select 
homeschooling as well as private school enrollment in fulfillment of 
compulsory attendance laws is evidence that courts recognize parental rights 
to choose from among a continuum of options when determining their 
children’s educational settings.35 
Three U.S. Supreme Court cases are presented in this article as 
historical evidence of the legally recognized rights and responsibilities of 
parents to educate their children.36 These cases fall along two controlling 
lines of theories regarding the parental rights doctrine. First, in two bulwark 
cases, the Supreme Court asserts that parents have clearly-established 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests to direct their children’s education.37 
                                                 
 28. Id. at 634. 
 29. Id.; See also Rachel E. Taylor, Responsibility for the Soul of the Child: The Role of 
the State and Parents in Determining Religious Upbringing and Education, 29 INT’L J. L., 
POL’Y & THE FAM. 15-35 (2015) (discussing a similar initiative in the United Kingdom). 
 30. TARCOV, supra note 26. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 49-50 (1987). 
 34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
 35. Chad Olsen, Constitutionality of Home Education: How the Supreme Court and 
American History Endorse Parental Choice, 2 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 399, 410 (2009). 
 36. Eric M. Zimmerman, Defending the Parental Right to Direct Education: Meyer 
and Pierce as Bulwarks Against State Indoctrination, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 311, 311 
(2004/2005); Heather M. Good, The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution: The Parental Free 
Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 641, 646-48 (2005). 
 37. Olsen, supra note 35, at 410-11. 
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Second, the Supreme Court recognized a higher standard of review required 
when parents exercise their liberty interests in connection with their free 
exercise of religion rights.38 
A.  Fundamental Rights Claim: Fourteenth Amendment Liberty 
Interest 
The parental liberty interest doctrine emerged from a direct conflict 
between a state legislature and foreign language teacher.39 Interestingly, the 
state’s interests were in direct conflict with both the teacher’s and parent’s 
interests in providing an education to the child.40 As the Supreme Court 
observed, the “right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to 
instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.”41 
Although some might argue the primary outcome of Meyer v. Nebraska was 
to protect the right to teach,42 the oft-quoted opinion suggests the Court was 
especially influenced by a similar desire to protect parental rights over their 
children.43 
The Meyer Court explicitly hesitated to define the exact meaning of 
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment protections, “No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”44 Nonetheless, the Court explained that liberty interests have been 
defined with certain clarity to include 
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men.45 
Accordingly, Justice McReynolds asserted that the statute requiring 
English-only instruction in the public schools was an unreasonable and 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 411-12. 
 39. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1923). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 400. 
 42. David M. Wagner, Homeschooling as a Constitutional Right: A Close Look at 
Meyer and Pierce and the Lochner-Based Assumptions They Made About State Regulatory 
Power, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 385, 389 (2014). 
 43. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”). 
 44. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 45. Id. 
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arbitrary interference with established parental rights as well as the teacher’s 
rights. 46  
Pierce v. Society of Sisters47 further strengthened the parental liberty 
interest doctrine and serves as a watershed case, in combination with Meyer, 
for the parental choice movement.48 Parents of students with disabilities who 
seek to exert choice and control over their children’s educational 
opportunities have consistently relied on Pierce as support for private school 
enrollment decisions.49 In Pierce, the right of parents to choose a private 
school emerged as a liberty interest as a result of a conflict between two 
private schools and the state of Oregon over the enforcement of compulsory 
attendance laws.50 According to the Court, the parents’ liberty interest was 
unreasonably burdened when the state sought to “standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”51 This case did 
not, however, negate states’ legitimate interests in educating all children 
residing within their states and communities. As such, parents could not 
preserve unlimited parental rights solely through geographic choices. 
In Pierce, the Court applied the Meyer v. Nebraska52 doctrine as a 
bar against state action that would unreasonably interfere with the “liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control” secured by the Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
protections.53 Subsequently, in Griswold v. Connecticut,54 the Supreme Court 
asserted “the right to educate one’s children as one chooses is made 
applicable to the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments,” and added, “[W]e reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the 
Meyer cases.”55 Further, the Court noted that even though the parents’ rights 
to choose public, private, or parochial are not mentioned in the Constitution 
or Bill of Rights, the spirit of the First Amendment includes such peripheral 
rights.56 
The parental rights doctrine has repeatedly been endorsed by the 
courts, as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
                                                 
 46. Id. at 403. 
 47. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 
 48. Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 325. 
 49. See Debra Drang & Margaret J. McLaughlin, Special Education Services for 
Parentally Placed Private School Students, 21 J. SPEC. EDUC. LEADERSHIP 3 (2008). 
 50. Wagner, supra note 42, at 411. 
 51. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 52. See 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 53. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
 54. See 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 55. Id. at 482-83. (“The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice -- 
whether public or private or parochial -- is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any 
particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to 
include certain of those rights.”). 
 56. Id. at 483. 
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Amendment.57 For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts,58 the Supreme Court 
recognized Meyer59 and Pierce60 as long standing precedents that affirmed 
parents’ fundamental interests in the education and religious upbringing of 
their children.61 More recently, in Gruenke v. Seip, the Third Circuit Court 
recognized that “[t]he right of parents to raise their children without undue 
state interference is well established.”62 
The Meyer-Pierce cases demonstrated that parents might be able to 
find recourse within the courts in response to governmental intrusions and 
interferences in their exercise of parental rights to direct the education and 
upbringing of their children. The section below describes how the hybrid 
rights claim gained recognition when the parental rights doctrine, in 
combination with a free exercise of religion claim, was asserted in a case 
involving a conflict between the parent’s control over the child’s religious 
and educational upbringing and the state’s interest in promoting education. 
B.   Hybrid Rights Claim: Liberty Interest & Free Exercise of 
Religion 
The parental rights doctrine established in Pierce and Meyer was 
reasserted in Wisconsin v. Yoder,63 by Amish parents who refused to send 
their children to a public school beyond a certain age, despite compulsory 
attendance laws to the contrary.64 The Amish parents asserted that the state 
compulsory attendance law imposed an undue burden on their First 
Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process rights regarding the direction of their children’s religious 
upbringing.65 While the Court recognized the state’s interest in education, it 
rejected the imposition on parents’ fundamental rights under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and on parents’ traditional interest 
in overseeing the religious upbringing of their children.66 
The Court concluded, “[W]hen the interests of parenthood are 
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, 
more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s 
requirement under the First Amendment.”67 Additionally, the Court asserted 
                                                 
 57. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
 58. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 59. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
 60. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
 61. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972). 
 64. James G. Dwyer, Religious Schooling and Homeschooling Before and After 
Hobby Lobby, 16 U. ILL. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (2016). 
 65. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 233. 
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that “parental educational rights as a form of religious liberty . . . were due 
the same consideration afforded free exercise rights—rights which had 
trumped competing state interests since ‘[l]ong before’ anyone 
acknowledged a need for public education.”68 The Supreme Court’s decision 
in this case is noteworthy given the recognition of a hybrid rights claim 
requiring more stringent judicial review when examining combined claims 
based on parents’ First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interests.69 
Despite assertions that hybrid rights claims are merely dicta,70 and 
thus Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests and First Amendment free 
exercise rights are not strengthened to the extent of raising the level of 
scrutiny required,71 the Supreme Court has previously made this very claim. 
Specifically, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court 
noted: 
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of 
the First, is much more definite than the test when only the 
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due 
process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of 
the First become its standard.72 
Barnette reinforces credibility of the hybrid rights claims by 
recognizing the enhanced protections necessary when Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interests are combined with First Amendment 
protections.73 
In fact, the Supreme Court has continued to affirm the parental rights 
doctrine as it applies to educational choices when parental interests conflict 
with state interests.74 In Troxel v. Granville,75 the Supreme Court affirmed 
the rights of parents to homeschool their children and to select private school 
options to meet state compulsory attendance laws. In essence, the Court 
reaffirmed that parents may choose from a continuum of options when 
                                                 
 68. Matthew Steilen, Parental Rights and the State Regulation of Religious Schools, 
2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 269, 274 (2009). 
 69. Id. at 339 (asserting that strict scrutiny may be the appropriate standard of review 
when both religious and parental rights doctrines are violated by state action). 
 70. Kyle Still, Smith’s Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right: An Unintelligent 
Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 409 (2006); Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 
(3rd Cir. 2008). 
 71. Still, supra note 70, at 414. 
 72. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943). 
 73. Schube, supra note 2, at 129-140. 
 74. See Bloom, supra note 10, at 177. 
 75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (asserting that the substantive due process 
protections affirmed in Pierce guaranteed the fundamental liberty interests of parents to 
control their children’s education). 
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determining their children’s educational settings.76 According to the Court, 
parents’ interest “in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.”77 
Although the opponents of school choice are generally concerned 
about the use of public funds to support private schools rather than focused 
on limiting parents’ exercise of control over education, the difficulty lies in 
trying to achieve balance between the states’ interests and parental rights to 
control education.78 For example, parents’ concerns range from disputes over 
curriculum choices that offend parents’ religious beliefs and family values,79 
to politically motivated concerns about curriculum that conflicts with 
parents’ ideals.80 School choice opponents do not appear to disagree with 
parental choice when it is exercised individually with no impact on the public 
school’s authority over education, but rather focus on how the unregulated 
exercise of choice affects the rights of students remaining in public school 
systems. Despite assertions that Pierce and Meyer were, in essence, focused 
on the extent of governmental limits regarding education rather than about 
assuring parental rights,81 these cases along with Yoder are consistently used 
to guide decisions that require balancing state interests against parental 
control over their children’s education. The exercise of parental control over 
the education and upbringing of children is increasingly sought through the 
adoption and spread of school choice reform initiatives. Yet, efforts to reform 
education through choice initiatives have been met with opposition.82 
Notably, discussions about parental choice have historically 
neglected the rights of parents to exercise control and choice regarding the 
education of students with disabilities.83 However, critical examination of 
school choice reform initiatives, such as charter schools and voucher 
programs, has revealed that both programs were largely unavailable to 
students with disabilities until recently. Now that discussions are evolving 
within the education reform choice movement to include options such as 
vouchers for students with disabilities, such efforts have encountered 
resistance from states and school choice opponents.84 
                                                 
 76. See Bloom, supra note 10, at 169. 
 77. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
 78. See Good, supra note 36, at 670. 
 79. See e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Public Schs., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
 80. Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s Education: Parents, Children, 
and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1369 (2006-2007). 
 81. See Wagner, supra note 42, at 404. 
 82. Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and 
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 819 (2011); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out 
Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2014). 
 83. See Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16. 
 84. Infra Part II. 
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II.  LIMITS ON PARENTAL RIGHTS AND CHOICE 
Despite general perceptions that the U.S. Constitution is the 
foundation upon which the Supreme Court established a parental rights 
doctrine,85 competing perspectives offer an alternative view in an effort to 
limit parental rights and the exercise of choice.86 Specifically, several lower 
court decisions recognize limits on the fundamental parental rights 
doctrine.87 Similarly, a few legal scholars have argued that the Supreme 
Court has established a parental rights doctrine only insofar as the Court 
recognized that a state may not unreasonably restrict parental control over 
their children, particularly with respect to education.88 
The parental rights movement peaked at the state level in 1996 when 
a general election ballot measure was introduced to amend the Colorado 
Constitution.89 The amendment would have established parents’ inalienable 
right to determine the education, values, and discipline of their children.90 
Although this initiative failed, the perception remains that parents need 
protection from state (and federal) efforts to exert undue influence over the 
upbringing and education of their children.91 
As a result of tensions between state interests and parental control, 
parents have sought relief in the courts from perceived governmental 
overreach with respect to education and parental control over children in 
general. Given the overwhelming lack of success by parents who challenged 
school curricular choices across the states,92 parents had to seek other 
                                                 
 85. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
 86. See generally JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD (2014). 
 87. See e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“We need not decide here whether the right to rear one’s children is fundamental 
because we find that, even if it were, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate an intrusion of 
constitutional magnitude on this right.”); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 
395 (6th Cir. 2005) (“While parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send 
their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a 
public school teaches their child.”). 
 88. See generally SHULMAN, supra note 86. 
 89. Linda Lane, The Parental Rights Movement, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 825 (1998). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d at 530; Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 312; 
Bruce H. Schwartz, Parental Rights: Educational Alternatives and Curriculum Control, 36 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 277, 285 (1979). 
 92. For an overview of parents’ unsuccessful state cases challenging curriculum, see 
Schube, supra note 2, at 132-37; see also Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Public Schs. 827 F.2d 
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alternatives through education reforms that endorsed parental choice. These 
alternatives included charter school movements, homeschooling, and 
voucher programs, among others. In other words, parents who perceived that 
“the states are . . . stripping the parents of their right to guide their children’s 
moral and religious upbringing”93 began searching for another avenue to 
protect their rights. Charter schools appear to offer a viable option to some 
parents, who desire the control to choose educational options that are 
different from “the curricular rigidity of a common schooling,” and are not 
necessarily seeking a religious school option.94 
The use of vouchers, however, is possibly more vulnerable than 
charter school options to constitutional or legislative barriers that limit the 
use of public funds for religious schools, due to concerns that such 
intermingling would violate the Establishment Clause. To some degree, the 
vulnerability of voucher programs is a result of anti-Catholic bias that swept 
the country and led many states to adopt state constitutional amendments that 
prohibited state support for religious schools.95 
This anti-Catholic bias emerged despite the failed efforts of 
Congressman James Blaine to introduce a constitutional amendment that 
would prohibit the distribution of state funds to religious schools.96 Blaine’s 
efforts sparked widespread adoption of constitutional provisions that 
restricted the flow of state funds to religious schools.97 The resulting Blaine 
Amendments were fostered in growth by Protestant unease with an 
increasing Catholic presence and resistance to the Protestant dominated 
public school curriculum.98 The following section briefly discusses the 
impact of the Blaine Amendments on parental choice, examines the 
collective purpose of education in society, and identifies the historic impact 
of racial animus on the rise of voucher programs. 
A.   Blaine Amendments 
Voucher programs will frequently involve the use of public dollars 
to fund private, oftentimes religious, schools. This use of public money in a 
religiously affiliated setting has led to criticism and conflict regarding 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Blaine Amendment 
provisions that widely exist in state constitutions.99 Special education 
voucher programs—often referred to as scholarships—have been 
successfully challenged in several state courts based on the invocation of the 
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Blaine provisions in state constitutions.100 On the other hand, the majority of 
challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment Establishment Clause, which is 
frequently cited when justifying the need for separation of church and state, 
have been unsuccessful.101 
Despite the widely-accepted anti-Catholic bias of the Blaine 
Amendments,102 the Supreme Court is seemingly reluctant to squarely 
address the constitutionality issue.103 Yet, the issue was implicated in Trinity 
Lutheran v. Comer,104 when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of religious 
liberties by holding a state policy denying grants to religious entities violated 
the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Despite tentative predictions that 
Trinity could prove the death knell for the Blaine Amendments,105 the Court 
drew upon the previous attempt to balance the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses instead of ruling directly on the constitutionality of the 
Blaine Amendments.106 
B.   Education’s Collective Purpose 
Opponents of school choice reform initiatives have often expressed 
concerns about parental choice reforms interfering with the important 
societal role of education in building collective purpose.107 In fact, the state’s 
argument in Yoder was premised in part on the ideals espoused by Thomas 
Jefferson, who “pointed out early in our history, that some degree of 
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and 
independence.”108 This essential argument about the greater purpose of 
education was rejected in Yoder, insofar as it interfered with the Amish 
parent’s combined liberty interest and free exercise rights. 
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C.   Race and School Vouchers 
Historically, evidence suggests that vouchers have been used to 
avoid desegregation efforts109 and to provide segregated publicly funded 
educational options for middle-class parents.110 In Griffin v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County,111 the Virginia General Assembly 
authorized the use of state funds to support public or non-sectarian private 
schools, which subsequently led a Virginia county to close all public schools 
and adopt vouchers for purposes of funding attendance at all-white private 
educational institutions. This historical context has contributed to numerous 
concerns about the risks associated with school vouchers.112 
Drawing from the Supreme Court’s rationale in Milliken v. 
Bradley,113 the scope of remedies to address racial discrimination found to be 
in violation of the equal protection clause is not unlimited. As such, the 
Supreme Court rejected the proposed plan requiring compulsory transfer of 
students across the Detroit public school system and the suburban districts 
bordering Detroit.114 Analogous claims to limit private school vouchers for 
students with disabilities, because permitting such choice would impact the 
civil rights of other students, are similarly problematic because such 
restraints transfer the burden from school districts to individual parents and 
children. The following section seeks to extend discussion beyond the 
balance of state and parental interests, by embarking on an examination of 
the federal government’s impact on parental control over education, 
particularly given the strict limitations on financial support available via the 
federal disability legislation, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).115  
III.  EDUCATION AND FEDERAL DISABILITY LAWS 
For purposes of this article, it is helpful to have a basic understanding 
of the essential federal disability laws protecting the rights of students with 
disabilities as well as the rights of their parents or guardians. Thus, this Part 
briefly summarizes the key legal provisions of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),116 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1974 (Section 504),117 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008 
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(ADA).118 Particular focus is paid to the IDEA given the targeted application 
of this federal law on ensuring educational benefit, meeting the 
individualized needs of students with disabilities, and guaranteeing parental 
rights and control over their children’s education. 
The explicit provisions of the IDEA protecting parental rights 
regarding the education of their children are a fundamental aspect of this 
federal law. Understanding these rights, not only in the public school setting 
but also in a wider education arena, is a critical element of this article. 
According to the IDEA, public schools are required to provide a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment 
(LRE) to students with disabilities.119 While the onus is clearly placed on 
public schools to comply with the IDEA mandate, parents are similarly 
burdened because the critical IDEA financial support and legal protections 
are lost by parents who exercise choice over the education and upbringing of 
their children. Specifically, public schools enjoy financial benefits and 
funding along with the strict legal mandates of the IDEA, and students with 
disabilities receive only what has been determined by the schools and school 
officials to be appropriate. Furthermore, private schools and other 
educational choice options are simply unavailable to the majority of students 
with disabilities because in these alternative settings, the students are not 
provided with financial support nor protected by the legal mandates that 
would benefit students with disabilities. 
The IDEA also addresses parental participation through mandates 
such as the due process hearing protections that ensure parents are included 
in the processes of identifying, evaluating, and placing their children in 
appropriate educational settings.120 Furthermore, parental rights and interests 
in providing for the educational needs of children with disabilities are directly 
addressed in our national disability policy, which furthers parents’ interests 
to pursue “equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
economic self-sufficiency” for their children with disabilities.121 
Parental interests in achieving these educational outcomes are further 
protected under the IDEA through guarantees to access the necessary and 
appropriate educational programs and services at no expense to the parent.122 
In order to achieve this provision of the IDEA, the unique educational needs 
of students with disabilities are to be identified in an individualized education 
program (IEP).123 Parents are critical members of the IEP development 
process and public schools are required to take specific steps that ensure 
parental participation in the development of the IEP during the IEP team 
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meeting.124 Furthermore, public schools “must ensure that a parent of each 
child with a disability is a member of any group that makes decisions on the 
educational placement”125 and the provision of FAPE to the child.126 
The FAPE provision has been interpreted as an essential provision 
of the IDEA requiring public schools to provide educational benefits to 
students.127 This benefit must meet more than a de minimis standard.128 As 
cited by the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District 
RE-1, “[A] student offered an educational program providing ‘merely more 
than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been 
offered an education at all.”129 
Although several in the disability community commended Endrew 
for dramatically improving the likelihood of positive educational 
opportunities for students with disabilities, it is still unclear if the decision 
will have any impact on parental choice or control over children with 
disabilities. 
Parental rights are generally protected with respect to educational 
choices such as the decision to enroll children in private school settings or 
homeschool children; however, the rights guaranteed under the IDEA are not 
guaranteed to parents who exercise these choices. Specifically, the public 
school system is not required to offer a FAPE to the student, whose parents 
have chosen education in a private school or home school setting. In other 
words, if parents fail to consent to the provision of services offered in the 
public school setting, the public school’s responsibility under the IDEA is 
essentially terminated. Furthermore, if the parents opt unilaterally to place 
their child in a private-school setting because they disagree or are unhappy 
with the public school IEP, services, or placement, there are limited 
circumstances in which the parents may seek reimbursement for the private 
school tuition or financial support for the home schooling option. 
Private school placements are an option, and tuition may be 
reimbursable under the IDEA in two general circumstances. First, tuition 
reimbursement of a private school placement may occur if the IEP team 
determines that the appropriate education, including placement, programs, 
and services, must occur in a private school setting to ensure the student 
receives FAPE.130 This first scenario is achieved through the cooperative 
efforts of parents and school officials, and the private school placement must 
be provided at no cost to the parents.131 In the second scenario, tuition 
reimbursement for private school placement may occur when parents are able 
                                                 
 124. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(e), 1415(b)(1) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 300.322 (2006). 
 125. 34 C.F.R. § 501(c)(1) (2006). 
 126. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(e), 1415(b)(1) (2010). 
 127. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 177 
(1982). 
 128. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 1001 (2017). 
 129. Id. 
 130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.145-300.147 (2006). 
 131. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (2006). 
2018] PROMISE OR PERIL 145 
to demonstrate that the public school failed to provide an appropriate 
education.132 
In general, decisions about private school enrollment are made 
following an interaction and consultation between parents and public school 
officials. Private school attendance is oft-viewed as an option reserved solely 
for wealthy and privileged individuals and can prove especially difficult to 
access for parents of students with disabilities.133 Given the legal parameters 
of the IDEA as explained in this Part, parents of students with disabilities are 
typically forced to take legal action in order to access private school options 
using public funds to support tuition expenses. 
Typically, the educational options available to parents of students 
with disabilities are determined by the IEP team or through litigation. 
Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court affirmed that public funds 
could be available to cover tuition for a student with a disability whose 
parents select the home schooling option.134 In this case, the court recognized 
that parents may request financial support for home instruction given the 
broad remedial authority of IDEA.135  
If special education voucher programs were available to parents of 
children with disabilities, this would provide increased choice, but also an 
alternate pathway for parental control over the upbringing of their children. 
Although the lure of choice appears to provide a distinct advantage to parents, 
some critics assert that parents and students with disabilities could be 
vulnerable in a private educational setting if it is not fully sanctioned by the 
public school.136 In other words, if parents do not pursue litigation to force a 
school board to award tuition reimbursement for the private school or do not 
succeed in convincing the school board to establish a private school setting 
as the appropriate placements ensuring FAPE, their choice of enrolling their 
child in a private school setting would result in the loss of federal funding 
and the protection afforded by the IDEA. 
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Although the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not 
as extensive as the IDEA in terms of providing specialized protections for 
students with disabilities, these federal protections would provide minimal 
safeguards for parents who enroll their children in private schools through 
the special education voucher programs.137 Specifically, private and public 
schools are not permitted to discriminate or prohibit access to individuals 
with disabilities who seek to participate in the schools’ services, programs, 
and activities.138 Even when the student would not qualify under the IDEA, 
Section 504 and the ADA are interpreted as coextensive laws protecting the 
rights of students with disabilities to be free from discrimination and provide 
parents an avenue to pursue litigation.139 However, Section 504 and the ADA 
may not apply in all circumstances. For example, if the private school does 
not receive public funding, Section 504 does not apply; and if the private 
school has fewer than twenty-five employees or has a religious affiliation 
waiver, it is possible that accommodations may not be required in the private 
school setting.140 
The efforts to hinder states from adopting special education voucher 
programs stem from essentially three basic concerns about the impact of 
vouchers on public schools and the well-being of students with disabilities. 
First, if students with disabilities are permitted to use vouchers to attend 
private schools, other students, whose parents choose not to access vouchers, 
will be left behind in underperforming public schools given the misdirection 
of public funds to private school settings.141 Second, the vouchers flow into 
private school settings with limited accountability for the use or results of 
such funds.142 Third and finally, if parents opt to enroll their child in a private 
school setting using a voucher, they will forfeit their rights and their 
children’s rights to the IDEA legal protections.143 
In response to the concerns raised by voucher opponents, proponents 
assert, “Rather than forcing dissatisfied families to accept subpar services or 
to pursue legal action for relief, vouchers permit a lower conflict, lower-cost 
method for resolving disagreements about the adequacy of public school 
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efforts.”144 The potential promise of school reform efforts has not yet been 
adequately provided to students with disabilities. In other words, the 
opportunities to exercise parental control over the education and upbringing 
of children are not accessible to parents of students with disabilities. Through 
ongoing reiterations of the IDEA parental rights provisions, the quality of 
and opportunity to access educational programs and services have 
dramatically improved for students with disabilities, however.145 Further, the 
long-term commitment to parental participation as a pivotal feature of the 
IDEA is evidence of the keen awareness of how critical it is for parents to be 
active participants in their children’s educational decisions.146 
Access to SVPs would provide parents of students with disabilities 
meaningful choice options and the ability to determine if a nonpublic setting 
might better meet the needs and preferences of their child and family. 
Although the IDEA envisions the possibility of private school placement for 
students with disabilities, this would typically involve a costly and time-
consuming encounter with the public school, whether through a due process 
hearing or possibly even litigation in the courts. Special education voucher 
programs offer families a choice that currently is fairly limited. Furthermore, 
given the limits on federal funds provided in support of students who qualify 
for programs and services under the IDEA, the public school option is given 
preferential treatment as the best option for all students with disabilities. 
Amidst the debate and increasing interest in the expansion of 
educational choices for parents, concerns have also arisen regarding the 
application of federal disability laws to public charter schools.147 
Fundamentally, the rigorous and prescriptive application of federal disability 
laws, such as the IDEA, on charter schools could likely curtail the very goal 
of independence and innovation enjoyed by charter school initiatives. Yet, 
without such laws, others express concern that students with disabilities 
might be neglected by the charter school reform movement. Further, without 
the IDEA accountability measures, students with disabilities and their parents 
risk access to essential programs and services to meet the child’s individual 
needs. 
Finally, given the extremely acrimonious nature of special education 
issues and the high number of due process and court cases initiated by 
parents, the benefits of IDEA are likely not enjoyed by all parents of students 
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with disabilities.148 Special education voucher programs may provide a 
meaningful opportunity for parents to adopt an alternative to litigation. The 
following Part highlights the key aspects of special education voucher 
programs and proposes the legislative reforms needed to extend the rights 
and financial supports of the IDEA to parents of students with disabilities 
who exercise choice by deciding to educate their children in non-public 
school settings. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM: SPECIAL EDUCATION VOUCHER PROGRAMS 
AND THE IDEA 
Special education voucher programs (SVPs) are part of a growing 
educational reform movement focused on expanding school choice options 
to parents of students with disabilities.149 “As is the case with many school-
choice programs, SVPs are highly controversial and politically charged.”150 
Specifically, voucher programs have sparked both ideological151 and legal152 
debates among educational policy reformers regarding the burdens153 and 
benefits154 of permitting parents to use publicly-funded vouchers to pay for 
private school tuition or services. According to proponents of this 
educational reform, “special education vouchers essentially use public funds 
to democratize access to private placement by reducing legal and financial 
barriers.”155 Opponents, on the other hand, assert, for example, that SVPs are 
contrary to the civil rights agenda in that they lead to further segregation both 
economically and racially, which then leads to diminished educational 
opportunities for students unable to benefit from the vouchers. The 
opponents also indicated that SVPs may put the educational needs of students 
with disabilities at risk because the nonpublic settings are not obligated to 
adhere to the federal protections provided by the IDEA. 
The likelihood of a dramatic increase in private school options is 
seemingly possible given recent momentum. While this momentum has 
included publicly-funded SVPs, lingering concerns about how federal 
disability laws apply in such settings reveal the need for legislative reform. 
Learning from statewide efforts to adopt SVPs, as well as the challenges from 
those who are opposed to such reform efforts, future initiatives should 
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incorporate several key protections.156 Specifically, statewide reform 
initiatives must include critical IDEA provisions in the existing and proposed 
special education voucher programs.157 
Extending the parental rights doctrine to protect students with 
disabilities can be achieved, in part, through choice initiatives such as the 
special education voucher programs emerging across the states.158 Efforts to 
protect parental rights should also include legislative reform of the IDEA to 
revise provisions that limit the availability of guaranteed protections and 
funding to meet the educational needs of students with disabilities. In the 
present form, the IDEA serves as an unintended barrier to parents of students 
with disabilities who desire meaningful choice and control over the 
upbringing of their children.159   
If the IDEA were amended to include a mechanism consistent with 
the child benefit theory,160 this would enable parents to exercise true choice 
but not be forced to give up public funding, significant disability protections, 
accountability provisions, etc. In other words, by adopting a child benefit 
theory perspective, in essence an IDEA voucher could permit funding and 
protections that accompany the child beyond the traditional public school 
boundaries. 
Legislative reform of the IDEA is consistent with previous Supreme 
Court rulings that extended governmental protections and funding to students 
in private school settings, in spite of concerns about perceived religious 
entanglement in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. For 
example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the school voucher program adopted by Ohio was neutral and exemplified “a 
program of true private choice.”161 Finally, according to the Court, the case 
presented no challenges to the Establishment Clause. 
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CONCLUSION 
Striking an appropriate balance between parental rights and state 
interests in educating children has been a recurrent theme in the courts for 
over eight decades.162 The exercise of parental rights to control the 
upbringing of their children and to determine an appropriate education should 
not depend solely on governmental expectations regarding desired outcomes 
or societal benefits of education. Further, the rights of parents of students 
with disabilities should not be infringed upon or modified purely to achieve 
governmental interests that exceed the state’s efforts or responsibilities to 
provide education. 
As stated in Meyer, an individual’s “liberty may not be interfered 
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action 
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the State to effect.”163 Although special education voucher 
programs include potential challenges, such as economic, racially 
discriminatory, or exclusionary impacts on public school students who are 
left behind,164 many of these challenges could be addressed through efforts 
to extend federal protections to parents who exercise choice. 
This article advocates for a reform agenda that aligns with the child 
benefit theory,165 because such efforts have the potential to create improved 
educational possibilities for students.166 Furthermore, with this trend, 
observers note that the distinction between public and private sectors must 
continue to be blurred.167 The changing political landscape is likely to 
facilitate renewed efforts to promote education reform agendas that include 
an emphasis on providing an increased number of choice options for parents 
of students with disabilities. The debate over parental rights is no longer 
narrowly focused on choice. Instead, parental choice should expand to 
incorporate a continuum of educational opportunities, especially for parents 
of students with disabilities, to secure education that is both high quality and 
consistent with parental values and beliefs.168 
                                                 
 162. See e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
 163. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
 164. See Wendy F. Hensel, Recent Developments in Voucher Programs for Students 
with Disabilities, 59 LOY. L. REV. 323 (2013). 
 165. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391; see Witters, 474 U.S. 481. 
 166. See Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Reality Over Ideology: A Practical View of Special 
Needs Voucher Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 53 (2014). 
 167. See generally Garnett, supra note 105. 
 168. See Bloom, supra note 10. 
